Unintelligent Intelligence Bureaucracy

Public disclosure of the National Security Agency's sweeping surveillance of telephone records has sparked a national debate over the right of privacy versus the need for security.  While an important issue, it ignores the larger question of cataclysmic U.S. intelligence failures despite vast troves of data.

Lost in the firestorm over government snooping has been the continuing intelligence breakdowns since the nation's worst catastrophe on September 11, 2001.  Recent reminders of bungling by intelligence agencies are almost too numerous to list.

For starters, military intelligence failed to make the connection between the alleged Fort Hood shooter and known terrorists.  Foreign intelligence analysts were caught off guard by the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia.  Despite warnings from the Russians, the intelligence community failed to act against two men accused of the Boston Marathon bombings.

Don't blame these fiascoes on the men and women who gather intelligence.  In every instance, including the infamous attack of September 11, the country's intelligence community had picked up signals and information that were either ignored, discounted or lost in the unwieldily bureaucracy.

The nation should be focused on a broader debate about systemic problems that dog the more than 1,271 government agencies that work on counterterrorism intelligence.  An alphabet soup of organizations are involved, including the FBI, NSA, CIA and DOD.

The problem is the gigantic government bureaucracy that has been constructed to oversee the nation's intelligence programs. For example, the Department of Homeland Security, created after 9/11, added another layer to an estimated 854,000 government and private sector employees engaged in intelligence work.

Like all government bureaucracies, the result has been delay and distortion of information as it is filtered through the sprawling intelligence apparatus.  There is redundancy, waste and duplication on a massive scale that costs taxpayers an estimated $75 billion annually, more than double intelligence spending pre-9/11,

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was supposed to fix the colossal bureaucracy.  The law was designed to enhance information sharing, promote cooperation between agency directors and improve the nation's ability to thwart acts of terror on U.S. soil.

However, adding a bunch of boxes on organizational charts only exacerbated the complexity.  U.S. intelligence remains discombobulated by overlapping responsibilities, bureaucratic rivalry, high turnover and muddled understanding of how each agency fits into the overall mission.

Ushering in a new intelligence director won't solve the problem. Changing the cultures of huge organizations requires more than a new face at the top.  The problems are embedded in the vast agencies staffed by longtime government employees whose allegiance is first to their boss.

Americans like to think of their national intelligence agencies in almost mythic terms, thanks to television and movies that celebrate their victories.  A more valid comparison might be the U.S. Post Office, a bureaucratic nightmare that strangles innovation.

The crux of the problem is not too little information and data. As recent revelations have documented, the United States mines massive amounts of data from a plethora of sources.  But what good is all that information if it never reaches the right person at the right time?   

Mountains of data won't keep the next terrorist attack from happening.  America must untangle the organizational octopus clutching its throat and streamline intelligence gathering to facilitate quick decision making and faster response to threats.